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Abstract
Of the triad of symptoms found in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), that is, social impairments, communication difficulties 
and repetitive interests and behaviour, the social impairments are the most stable and common throughout the lifespan. They 
typically manifest themselves in abnormalities as reciprocal interactions and difficulties in the expression and recognition 
of emotions. Although peer interactions become especially important during adolescence, little is known about the mental-
izing abilities of high-functioning adolescents with ASD. Here, we compared the mentalizing skills and emotion recognition 
abilities of 21 high-functioning adolescents with ASD and 21 matched controls. All adolescents had estimated above-average 
verbal intelligence levels. Spontaneous social abilities and task-related social abilities were measured using questionnaires, 
tasks and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule. Results confirm social impairment in daily life situations in adoles-
cents with ASD, but were not found on experimental tasks of social cognition. The use of more explicit cognitive or verbally 
mediating reasoning techniques and a lesser tendency of high-functioning adolescents with ASD to search for and use social 
information in natural environments are further discussed.
Keywords Autism · Adolescents · Above-average intelligence · Social behaviour · Social cognition · Ecological validity · 
Theory of mind
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a heterogeneous neu-
rodevelopmental syndrome, which is characterized by 
persistent deficits in social communication and social 
interaction across multiple contexts and restricted, repeti-
tive patterns of behaviour, interest or activities (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013). Individuals with ASD show 
a large heterogeneity in phenotype, severity and type and 
frequency of symptoms. In addition, symptoms can change 
within one person over the course of development (Hill and 
Frith 2003; Levy et al. 2009; Wing 1997). However, as ini-
tially stated by Kanner (1943), and still relevant today: ‘The 
outstanding, “pathognomonic”, fundamental disorder is the 
children’s inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way 
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to people and situations from the beginning of life’ (p.242). 
This statement is supported by recent research showing that 
of the triad of symptoms, social impairments are the most 
stable symptom not only in children, but also in adolescents, 
adults and elderly and across all developmental levels (Shat-
tuck et al. 2007). As such, they are considered more cen-
tral and persistent than the other core symptoms of autism 
(James et al. 2006; Seltzer et al. 2004; Shattuck et al. 2007). 
These social impairments typically manifest themselves in 
abnormalities in reciprocal interactions and difficulties in the 
expression and recognition of emotions (Bauminger 2002).
Although the social difficulties are independent of age 
and developmental level, their impact may disproportionally 
increase during adolescence (Nicpon et al. 2010; Pellicano 
2010). Compared with children, adolescents are more socia-
ble and form more complex relationship with their peers. 
The formation of social networks contributes to their iden-
tity development and affects their self-esteem. Adolescents 
are also more sensitive to acceptance and rejection by their 
peers (Blakemore 2008; Steinberg and Morris 2001). That is, 
during this developmental period, opinions and evaluations 
of peers become increasingly salient and many adolescents 
with ASD begin to notice how they differ from their peers 
(Burnett et al. 2009; Crone and Dahl 2012; Steinberg 2005). 
This is especially noticeable in high-functioning adolescents 
with ASD as they, more than their low-functioning counter-
parts, seek and initiate social interaction with peers (Baum-
inger et al. 2003; Hauck et al. 1995). The effects hereof may 
be found in the development of anxiety or mood disorders 
and feelings of social loneliness (the perceived lack of social 
involvement with peers) in high-functioning adolescents 
with ASD (Bauminger 2002; White et al. 2009; White and 
Roberson-Nay 2009). Thus, despite the general assumption 
of social aloofness in ASD, these reports of loneliness and 
the relatively high degree to which high-functioning ado-
lescents with ASD initiate social interactions with peers 
(Bauminger et al. 2003) indicate that they do want to take 
part in more satisfying social relationships. Despite the dif-
ferent impact social impairments have in the different devel-
opmental stages, numerous studies have been performed on 
the underlying mechanisms of social impairments in younger 
children with ASD or in adolescents with ASD with low 
to average intelligence levels, but only limited research has 
been done on social-cognitive function in high-functioning 
adolescents with ASD with high-average to above-average 
intellectual functioning.
For social interaction to be successful, it is necessary to 
understand another persons’ emotions, intentions, believes 
and knowledge (David et al. 2010). This information is 
needed to predict another person’s behaviour and adjust 
one’s own behaviour accordingly. The ability to impute 
and understand the mental states of others, and recog-
nize that these states may differ from your own is called 
‘mentalizing’ or having a theory of mind (ToM) (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1985; Premack and Woodruff 1978; Vollm 
et al. 2006). The ability to mentalize depends on a range 
of both lower level mechanisms, such as face and emotion 
processing, gaze direction and the detection of animacy, 
as well as higher executive function mechanisms such as 
attention and working memory (see Stone and Gerrans 
2006 for a review). Of these, particularly the human face 
and its emotional expressions play an important role in 
mentalizing, as they constitute an important source of 
information about a person’s inner state. Developmental 
trajectories of both mentalizing and emotion recognition 
abilities reach near-adult levels around age eleven, with a 
further refinement of these skills during adolescence and 
across the adult lifespan (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; see 
Brune and Brune-Cohrs 2006 for a review; Perner and 
Wimmer 1985; Rump et al. 2009).
Although mentalizing problems in individuals with ASD 
have been a major topic in autism research since the early 
1980s, there is still little information available on the men-
talizing abilities in high-functioning adolescents with ASD. 
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies investigated 
these abilities in a group of high-functioning adolescents 
with either Asperger syndrome or autism (Kaland et al. 
2007, 2008). Participants in these studies were 21 early-
to-late adolescents with ASD and 20 typically developing 
matched controls. In their first study, Kaland and colleagues 
(Kaland et al. 2007) used an adjusted and contextually more 
complex version of the Strange Stories Task (Happé 1994), 
whereby the participants had to make mental-state infer-
ences versus physical state inferences in a story context. 
Adolescents with ASD made more errors compared with 
controls and had slower reaction times especially on the 
mental-state interference task. The authors concluded that 
the adolescents with ASD had more problems compared 
with controls in making inferences about mental states. The 
second study was seemingly conducted with the same par-
ticipant group (Kaland et al. 2008). In this study, the perfor-
mance of the participants on three different advanced theory 
of mind tasks, that is, The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), the Strange Stories Test (Happé 
1994) and the Stories of Everyday Life (Kaland et al. 2002), 
were compared. The results showed that the adolescents 
with ASD performed worse than the typically developing 
controls on all three mentalizing tasks. In both studies, the 
authors made no direct link between the performance of the 
adolescents with ASD on the mentalizing tasks and their 
more spontaneous mentalizing abilities as for example seen 
on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), 
a standard diagnostic measure of ASD (Lord et al. 2010), 
or between the tasks and the adolescents’ social functioning 
outside the laboratory setting.
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Also important for social interaction in daily life is 
the ability to perceive and label expressions. However, 
emotion perception has also only been marginally inves-
tigated in high-functioning adolescents with ASD (Rump 
et al. 2009; Tracy et al. 2011), with contradicting results. 
Some studies showed that high-functioning adolescents 
with ASD were able to recognize (complex) emotional 
facial expressions just as fast and accurate as typically 
developing teens (Rump et al. 2009; Tracy et al. 2011; 
Jones et al. 2011), whereas other studies showed that they 
were less accurate than their typically developing coun-
terparts (Kuusikko et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010; Mazza 
et al. 2014; Brosnan et al. 2015; Greimel et al. 2014; Wal-
lace et al. 2011). Only the result of one study (Wallace 
et al. 2011) was related to the behavioural problems these 
adolescents with ASD have in everyday life. They found 
that diminished perceptual sensitivity to sad faces was 
positively related to the number of social communication 
symptoms (as measured with the ADOS) and adaptive 
functioning (as measured with the Adaptive Behaviour 
Assessment System-II) in a group of 42 high-functioning 
(IQ > 80) adolescents with ASD when compared with a 
normal control group.
In all, little attention has been paid to social cognition in 
high-functioning autism, especially in adolescence, a life 
phase in which social skills are crucial for developing and 
maintaining successful relationships with peers. Both ToM 
and emotion recognition are important aspects of social 
cognition. However, while there is abundant evidence for 
a ToM deficit in ASD, the findings on emotion recognition 
are mixed. Recently, Happé and Conway (2016) even argued 
that although ToM deficits are a hallmark of ASD, deficits 
in emotion recognition are not. Furthermore, the relation 
between social-cognitive processes such as mentalizing and 
emotion perception and everyday social functioning is also 
unclear and especially poorly studied in high-functioning 
adolescents with ASD.
In the current study, we address these shortcomings by 
examining both mentalizing and emotion recognition abili-
ties of high-functioning adolescents with ASD and matched 
typically developing controls. We aimed to relate their 
results with more spontaneous mentalizing skills as seen 
on the ADOS and their social functioning as measured with 
self-reports about friendship and feelings of acceptance. By 
doing so, we aim to get more insight into the mentalizing 
abilities of these high-functioning teens with ASD and find 
out if the skills we measure in the laboratory setting relate to 
the skills they are able to use in real life. Based on the exist-
ing literature, we assume to find impaired mentalizing abili-
ties in high-functioning adolescents with ASD compared to 
the control group. Due to the scarcity and contradictory evi-
dence of previous reports, emotion recognition abilities and 
the relation between the adolescents’ social abilities in- and 
outside the structured setting of the laboratory were assessed 
in an exploratory way.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-nine high-functioning adolescents with ASD were 
recruited from a special secondary education school ‘De 
Berkenschutse’ located in Heeze, the Netherlands. Of this 
group, twenty-five adolescents fulfilled the established diag-
nostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) according 
to the DSM-5 (APA 2013) as well as the autism algorithm 
cut-offs on the ADOS. Controls were twenty-nine adoles-
cents without a history of psychological or psychiatric ill-
ness. Adolescents of both groups followed pre-university 
education or senior general secondary education. The groups 
were matched on education level, years of education, age 
and gender. Exclusion criteria for both groups were: an 
estimated verbal intelligence below 110, a diagnosis of a 
psychological disorder or psychiatric disease as formulated 
in the DSM-5 (APA 2013), such as attention-deficit and dis-
ruptive behaviour disorders, separation anxiety disorders, 
selective mutism, reactive attachment disorder of infancy or 
early childhood, anxiety disorders and mood disorders, addi-
tional factors that can influence cognitive functioning such 
as pathology of the central nervous system (CNS), or a sig-
nificant visual or hearing impairment. Four adolescents with 
ASD and eight controls did not have an estimated above-
average verbal intelligence and were excluded. Eventually, 
21 adolescents (one female) with ASD and 21 typically 
developing control adolescents (four females) participated 
in this study.
All adolescents had an estimated verbal intelligence over 
109 [range ASD: 114–144; range controls: 111–144], as 
measured with a short version of the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children (WISC-III) (Campbell 1998; Donders 
2001). The two groups did not differ with respect to edu-
cation level, years of education, age and sex distribution. 
Although the groups were matched on education level and 
years of education, there was a significant difference in esti-
mated verbal intelligence and full-scale intelligence levels, 
but effect sizes were small (Table 1). The study protocol was 
approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of Maastricht 
University Medical Centre. In accordance with the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, informed consents were obtained from all 
adolescents and their parents or caregivers.
Materials and procedure
All participants who returned the informed consent form 
(adolescent and their parents/caregivers) were asked to fill 
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out and return questionnaires with items related to their 
spontaneous social functioning. The ADOS module 4 was 
administered to all adolescents with ASD to confirm the 
diagnosis and to get an impression of their more spontaneous 
social functioning skills as well. All participants completed 
two social cognition tasks: the Director Task and Emotion 
Recognition Task (ERT).
Social functioning
The Child Behavior Checklist and Youth Self-Report (Achen-
bach 1996, 1997) are questionnaires assessing the adoles-
cent’s competence, behavioural problems and emotional 
problems. Of these questionnaires, raw scores of the items 
‘Number of friends’, ‘Frequency of contact with friends’, 
‘Behavior with others’ and ‘Behavior alone’ of the Social 
subscale were used. Both the construct validity and criterion 
validity of the Child Behavior Checklist and Youth Self-
Report are sufficient (Evers et al. 2007).
The Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents is a ques-
tionnaire that measures the adolescents self-concept on 
six domains of competence and assesses a global sense of 
self-worth (Treffers et al. 2002). The Self-Perception Profile 
for Adolescents has a good internal consistency, test–retest 
reliability and construct validity (Evers et al. 2007; Tref-
fers et al. 2002). In the current study, the raw scores of the 
subscales ‘Social acceptance’ and ‘Close friendships’ were 
used.
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 
(Lord et al. 2010) module 4 is a semi-structured, standard-
ized assessment of social, communication and language 
skills in adolescents and adults who are verbally fluent. 
The ADOS has an excellent interrater reliability and inter-
nal consistency, and the sensitivity and specificity for ASD 
relative to non-spectrum disorders are also found to be 
excellent (Lord et al. 2000). During the ADOS assessment, 
activities and unstructured conversation are combined with 
structured situations and interview questions that offer a 
chance to observe a variety of behaviour. The goal of the 
ADOS module 4 is to determine how well the participant 
is able to initiate and sustain social interaction in situations 
with minimal structure and direction. The assessment takes 
45–50 min, is recorded on video and scored afterwards by 
a trained examiner. The ADOS module 4 has four domain 
scores: (1) communication, (2) social interaction, (3) com-
munication–social interaction total and (4) stereotyped 
behaviours and restricted interests. Higher scores on the 
domains indicate more problems on that specific domain.
Social cognition: theory of mind
The Director Task is a computerized perspective taking ToM 
task, which requires the participant to infer the perspective 
and intentions of another person (the director) and to act 
upon it in order to select the appropriate response (Apperly 
et al. 2010). This is an experimental task, which in previous 
research showed good discriminative validity (Dumontheil 
et al. 2010; Symeonidou et al. 2016). For this study, we 
translated this task into Dutch (for an example of the English 
version see Dumontheil et al. 2010).
Participants view stimuli in a cabinet with 4 × 4 shelves 
containing eight different objects. Five slots were occluded 
at the rear side of the cabinet. In each trial, the participant 
hears a director giving an instruction to move one of the 
eight objects in a particular direction. Next, the participant 
is asked to click on the referred object and drag it to the 
appropriate slot in the cabinet. In the Director condition, a 
‘director’ is standing behind the cabinet, from whose per-
spective the contents of five slots are not visible (Fig. 1). 
In this condition, participants have to take into account the 
perspective of the director when executing the instructions. 
Participants were told that objects in slots with a grey back-
ground were visible only to them, whereas the other objects 
could be seen from either side of the cabinet. There are three 
kinds of instructions: (1) in experimental trials, the instruc-
tion referred to one object (‘target’) given from the director’s 
point of view but would refer to another object (‘distractor’) 
if one assumed participants’ perspective. As such, partici-
pants need to take the director’s perspective into account to 
give a correct response in the experimental trials (Fig. 2a). 
(2) In control trials, the arrangement of the objects on the 
shelves was identical to the experimental trails except that 
an irrelevant object replaces the distractor object (e.g. the 
instruction referred to an object that is visible to both par-
ticipant and the director; Fig. 2b). (3) Filler trial instructions 
Table 1  Demographic and descriptive data of the ASD and control 
group
Because we used a short version of the WISC-III, the Verbal Intel-
ligence Quotient (VIQ) could not be calculated
ASD autism spectrum disorder, VCI Verbal Comprehension Index, 
FSIQ full-scale intelligence quotient, Control control group, ASD 
ASD group, RSI reciprocal social interaction, SBRI stereotyped 
behaviours and restricted interests
ASD Control
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p value Effect size ( 휂2
p
)
Sex (m:f ratio) 20:1 17:4 0.343
Age in months 173.0 (18.2) 170.8 (18.9) 0.446 0.015
FSIQ 119.0 (5.5) 113.0 (7.4) 0.005 0.182
VCI 123.6 (7.4) 118.5 (7.7) 0.036 0.106
ADOS
Communica-
tion
3.95 (1.60) –
RSI 7.10 (2.51) –
SBRI 1.00 (1.05) –
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refer only to objects in empty slots, that is, to objects that are 
visible to both the director and participant (e.g. the camera 
in Fig. 2). In the No-Director condition, no director was 
standing behind the cabinet and participants are told that the 
instructions only refer to objects in the clear slots; objects in 
slots with a grey background should be ignored (Fig. 2c, d). 
Other than this, the No-Director trials were identical to the 
Director trials and had experimental, control and filler trials. 
The test consists of two sets (one for each condition) of 
eight different shelf-object configurations. Each stimulus 
was presented for 2 s before the first auditory instruction was 
given. Three auditory instructions of each 2.2 s were given 
per stimulus. After the instructions, participants had 3.6 s to 
make their response. In total, there were eight control trials, 
eight experimental trials and 48 filler trials in each condi-
tion (Director and No-Director). The Director condition was 
assessed before the No-Director condition in all participants, 
in order to prevent participants to apply the strategy of the 
No-Director condition in the Director condition.
Social cognition: emotion recognition
The ERT is a task in which dynamically morphed facial 
expressions are presented at different levels of intensities 
(Kessels et al. 2014). This is a task that in previous research 
showed good discriminative validity (Smith et al. 2010). 
Participants view short video clips which show a neutral 
face gradually changing into one of the six basic facial emo-
tions; anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise 
(Ekman 1992; Ekman and Friesen 1971). After viewing the 
video clip, the participant has to select which emotion was 
shown from a list of six emotions. No time restriction was 
used. The version of the ERT used here included morphs 
from neutral to four different intensities; from 0–40, 0–60, 
0–80 to 0–100%. The video clips were presented in a fixed 
order of four blocks containing twenty-four trials, always 
starting with the lower intensities after which the intensity 
was increased.
Statistical analysis
Data analysis was performed using the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences version 20.0. Raw scores were used in 
all analyses, unless otherwise indicated. There was a signifi-
cant difference between the two groups on VCI and FSIQ; 
therefore, these variables could not act as a covariate in the 
statistical analysis (Field 2009; Miller and Chapman 2001). 
Group comparisons on social behaviour, ToM and emo-
tion recognition abilities were made using MANOVAs and 
mixed model MANOVAs. Correlational analyses were con-
ducted to investigate the relationship between ToM (Director 
task) and emotion recognition (ERT) abilities, and between 
ToM/emotion recognition abilities and spontaneous social 
functioning (ADOS and questionnaires) in both groups 
separately.
Results
Social functioning
Significant differences were found on the ‘Number of 
friends’ [p < 0.001, 휂2
p
= 0.35 ], the ‘Frequency of contact 
with friends’ [p = 0.011, 휂2
p
= 0.15 ] and the ‘Behavior (get-
ting along) with others’ [p < 0.001, 휂2
p
= 0.36 ] subscales of 
the Child Behavior Checklist. Parents of adolescents with 
ASD reported that their children had fewer real friends, 
had less contact with their friends outside school and 
were less able to get along with others compared with 
Fig. 1  Instruction screens to explain the task to participants. The cabinet on the left is shown from the participant’s point of view, and the cabinet 
on the right is shown from the Director’s point of view
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the reports of the parents of adolescents in the control 
group. On the Youth Self-Report, a significant difference 
was found on the ‘Behavior (getting along) with others’ 
[p = 0.001, 휂2
p
= 0.23 ] subscale; adolescents with ASD 
reported that they were less able to get along with others 
compared with the reports of the control group (Table 2). 
On the Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents, adoles-
cents with ASD reported no significant differences on 
the subscales ‘Social acceptation’ [Control: M = 15.33, 
SD= 2.78; ASD: M = 13.90, SD= 3.13] and ‘Close friend-
ships’ [Control: M = 17.14, SD= 2.87; ASD M = 15.67, 
SD= 3.72], when compared with controls.
Social cognition: theory of mind
A mixed model MANOVA with condition (Director, No-
Director) and trial type (control, experimental) as within-
subject factors and group (Control, ASD) as between-group 
factor revealed highly significant main effects for condition 
[F(1,36) = 16.750, p < 0.0005, 휂2
p
= 0.32 ], and trial type 
[F(1,36) = 29.366, p < 0.0005, 휂2
p
= 0.45 ], with more errors 
being made on the Director condition versus the No-Director 
condition, and more errors being made on the experimental 
trails than on the control trials. No overall effect of group 
was found [F(1,36) = 0.097, p = 0.757, 휂2
p
= 0.003 ] (see 
Fig. 3). Although not statistically significant, a trend was 
found for the interaction between condition and trial type 
Fig. 2  Stimuli of the Director task. a b Director condition; the par-
ticipant hears the instruction ‘move the big jar right’ from the Direc-
tor. In an Experimental trial (a), if the participant does not take the 
director’s perspective into account, he or she would move the jar with 
stones instead of the jar with cherries, which cannot be seen from the 
directors side. In a control trial (b), the distractor is replaced by an 
irrelevant object (goose). c, d No-Director condition; the participant 
is told that instructions do not refer to items in slots with a grey back-
ground; therefore, the correct responses are the same as in de Director 
condition
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[F(1,36) = 3.918, p = 0.055, 휂2
p
= 0.10 ], with slightly more 
errors being made on the experimental trials in the Director 
condition versus the No-Director condition. All other inter-
action effects were non-significant with F values below one.
Social cognition: emotion recognition
A mixed model MANOVA with emotion (anger, disgust, 
fear, happy, sad, surprise) and intensity (40, 60, 80, 100%) as 
within-subject factors and group (Control, ASD) as between-
group factor showed significant main effects for emotion 
[F(5,36) = 158.608, p < 0.000, 휂2
p
= 0.96 ], and intensity 
[F(3,38) = 14.799, p < 0.000, 휂2
p
= 0.54 ]. The effect of 
intensity showed a linear trend [F(1,40) = 36.082, p < 0.000, 
휂
2
p
= 0.47 ], the higher the intensity, the higher the scores. No 
overall group effect was found [F(1,40) = 0.200, p = 0.657, 
휂
2
p
= 0.01 ] (see Fig. 4). There was a significant interaction 
effect between emotion and intensity [F(15,26) = 6.285, 
p = <0.000, 휂2
p
= 0.78 ], but no other significant interaction 
effects were found (all F values < 1). In both groups, 80% of 
the participants scored above the second percentile on the 
various emotions compared with the normative data the ERT 
(Kessels et al. 2014).
Correlations
Correlational analyses showed no significant correlation 
between intelligence (VCI, FSIQ) and the tasks (Director 
Task, ERT). Correlational analyses between the two tasks 
showed a significant correlation between the ERT and the 
‘Director Task - Experimental items’ in the control group 
[r = −0.547, p = 0.013]. In the ASD group, no significant 
correlations between these two tasks were found.
Table 2  Social behaviour as 
measured with the CBCL and 
YSR for the ASD and control 
group
ASD autism spectrum disorder, CBCL Child Behavior Checklist, YSR Youth Self-Report
CBCL ASD Controls
Mean SD Mean SD p value Effect size ( 휂2
p
)
Number of real friends 1.2 0.98 2.4 0.67 < 0.0005 0.345
Seeing friends outside school 0.4 0.60 1.0 0.78 0.011 0.152
Getting along with others 0.8 0.44 1.4 0.43 < 0.0005 0.362
Plays/works alone 1.5 0.75 1.2 0.51 0.157 0.049
YSR
Number of real friends 2.3 0.73 2.6 0.50 0.109 0.064
Seeing friends outside school 0.8 0.77 1.1 0.85 0.185 0.045
Getting along with others 1.0 0.31 1.3 0.36 0.001 0.230
Plays/works alone 0.4 0.75 1.4 0.51 0.694 0.004
Director
control
Director
experimental
No-director
control
No-director
experimental
Fig. 3  Mean number of errors and standard errors of the mean on the 
Director Task for adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and controls
Fig. 4  Mean performance (number correct) and standard errors of the 
mean for the six basic emotions on the Emotion Recognition Task for 
the adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and controls
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Correlations between the two tasks and more spontane-
ous social functioning (as measured with the ADOS and 
items of the Child Behavior Checklist, Youth Self-Report 
and Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents) were not sig-
nificant in either group.
Discussion
The first aim in this study was to compare mentalizing 
and emotion recognition abilities in high-functioning ado-
lescents with ASD and a matched typically developing 
control group. We wanted to compare the groups on both 
their spontaneous social abilities and their task-related 
social abilities. Our results confirm the expected social 
impairments in high-functioning adolescents with ASD in 
daily life situations; however, we could not confirm these 
impairments during task performance.
In line with other studies, friendship characteristics of 
high-functioning adolescents with ASD differ from those 
of their normal developing peers (Bauminger et al. 2008a, 
b; Kuo et al. 2013). According to their parents, the adoles-
cents with ASD in our study have fewer real friends and 
they meet their friends less often outside school compared 
with the control group. In general, they report that their 
children are less able to get along with others. Consider-
ing the three dimensions of friendship in adolescence (i.e. 
companionship, intimacy-trust, closeness-affection), and 
the fact that individuals with ASD by definition have peer 
difficulties (Bauminger et al. 2008b; Mazurek and Kanne 
2010), we expected to find these results.
This perspective of friendship characteristics as 
reported by their parents, however, is not in concordance 
with how the adolescents with ASD describe these friend-
ships themselves. Although they do report being less able 
to get along with others, their reports on social accept-
ance, the number of close friendships and the frequency 
of contact with their friends were comparable with con-
trols. These results may be explained by differences in the 
definition of friendship that parents and high-functioning 
adolescents with ASD use. For example, Kuo and col-
leagues (2013) suggested that adolescents with ASD may 
consider peers who have similar interests to be a friend, 
whereas their parents may consider someone a friend only 
then if there is a relationship with mutual interactions and 
emotional interchanges. Another explanation may be that 
parents underestimate the adolescents’ friendships because 
they assume that because their child has ASD, (s)he per 
definition would have fewer (closer) friends (Kuo et al. 
2013). Considering that the adolescents with ASD in our 
study went to a special education school, their parents may 
also have less insight in the quality of the friendships, 
as out-of-school contact with friends mainly occurs via 
social media, or because adolescents in general may be 
inclined to a lesser extent to share their social life with 
their parents. However, scores on the item ‘Insight in 
social relationships’ from the ADOS show that more than 
70% of the adolescents with ASD in our study have no or 
limited insight into the nature of social relationships and/
or his/her own role in it. In combination with the fact that 
all adolescents with ASD in our study scored on or above 
the ASD cut-off level on ‘Reciprocal social interaction 
problems’ of the ADOS, it is more likely that these ado-
lescents with ASD use a different definition of friendship. 
Despite these differences in friendship definition of high-
functioning adolescents with ASD and the problems that 
they have in their everyday life with forming and main-
taining social relationships (Scheeren et al. 2013), these 
problems were not confirmed on task level. Even on an 
advanced ToM test (Director Task) and on the recogni-
tion of more complex emotions such as ‘surprise’ of the 
ERT, where the participant has to make inferences about 
someone else’s thoughts (Loveland et al. 1997), we do not 
find significant differences between adolescents with ASD 
and the control group.
Although most often not investigated in high-function-
ing adolescents with ASD, this discrepancy between social 
interaction problems in everyday life and the absence of 
deficits on neuropsychological tests of social cognition has 
been repeatedly reported in the ASD literature (Dahlgren 
and Trillingsgaard 1996; Rump et al. 2009; Russell and Hill 
2001; Scheeren et al. 2013; Senju et al. 2009; Tracy et al. 
2011). This apparent discrepancy could be explained by the 
use of compensation techniques that high-functioning indi-
viduals with ASD are often able to apply in more structured 
settings. By using explicit cognitive or verbally mediated 
reasoning techniques, in contrast to more automatic social 
information processing that normal developing individu-
als use, high-functioning people with ASD are able to pass 
complex emotion recognition and mentalizing tasks (Harms 
et al. 2010; Loveland et al. 1997; Senju et al. 2009). Also, 
the demands of social interaction in daily life are not as 
explicitly defined as, for example, task instructions of social-
cognitive tests. Therefore, mental-state attribution in high-
functioning individuals with ASD may also be prompted 
by explicit task structure and instructions (Scheeren et al. 
2013; Senju et al. 2009). A forced-choice paradigm, as in 
the ERT, may facilitate the recognition of facial emotions, 
especially if the adolescents with ASD are formally trained 
to identify emotions using such labels. This kind of training 
is often a standard component of intervention programs and 
may have influenced the test results of the ASD group in the 
current study.
Another additional explanation might be that high-func-
tioning adolescents may not spontaneously be looking for, or 
detecting and using information from multiple simultaneous 
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and dynamic sources in social situations, even though they 
might be able to comprehend them (Grossman et al. 2000; 
Jones et al. 2011). They may avoid making eye contact, fixate 
on the mouth region (Neumann et al. 2006) or miss a more 
general tendency to seek and initiate in social interactions. 
This may explain why high-functioning adolescents with 
ASD do not spontaneously attribute mental states, although 
they perform well on social functioning tasks. This is also 
consistent with the finding that training of mental-state attri-
butions does not necessarily improve social adaptation in 
ASD (Begeer et al. 2011; Loveland et al. 1997; Ozonoff 
and Miller 1995; Senju 2013), although some reports show 
promising results (Bauminger 2002; Stichter et al. 2010) of 
task-related transfer to various non-trained social situations.
Both explanations, that is, the use of compensation tech-
niques either or not in combination with the lesser tendency 
to search for and use social information in more natural envi-
ronments, may also explain why we do not find a relationship 
between our tasks and daily functioning levels; they may not 
measure the same cognitive or psychological construct. A 
limitation of the current study is the relatively small sample 
size, which may have limited our power for detecting pos-
sible significant differences between our groups.
With respect to future recommendations, more research in 
larger samples is needed to investigate whether social behav-
iour and social cognition in high-functioning adolescents 
with ASD are in fact two sides of the same coin. A further 
challenge is to understand how exactly the aforementioned 
compensation in ASD takes place. That is, compensation in 
ASD has not received much attention so far, despite many 
open questions such as whether or not apparently success-
ful compensation comes at a cost, and how compensation is 
modulated by the environment (see also a recent review by 
Livingston and Happé 2017). Moreover, it is still unclear 
which developing individuals with ASD will be able to 
acquire successful compensation in later life, as the het-
erogeneity in clinical presentation, course and potentially 
underlying neurocognitive mechanisms is large (cf. Happé 
and Conway 2016). Finally, the ecological validity of experi-
mental social-cognitive paradigms, which are by definition 
highly structured, especially in a research setting, remains 
to be studied in more detail.
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